In the mountains north of Beijing, Luo Li’s ski resort is a rare post-pandemic success story. It’s also becoming a model for a significant, albeit risky, shift in Chinese economic policy. When Luo first opened the Wanlong complex in Chongli about twenty years ago, he had more staff than customers. The area’s fortunes changed dramatically after China hosted the 2022 Winter Olympics, which brought new transport infrastructure and encouraged seven more resorts to open nearby.
Once pandemic restrictions were lifted, the crowds arrived. Now, Wanlong is profitable for a second straight year. “We created the demand,” said the 64-year-old entrepreneur, who employs 1,200 staff to cater to 600,000 visitors. “Agglomeration effects really matter. When I was the only ski resort here, it was very hard to attract people on my own.”
Luo’s experience is one that Chinese authorities are keen to replicate. They are signaling a policy shift this year to redirect state-led stimulus away from sometimes-wasteful investments in transport, housing, and industrial infrastructure toward potentially more productive service sectors. The hope is that by building out service facilities, latent household demand can be unlocked, helping to revive consumer spending—a longstanding weak spot in the economy. So far, measures to boost consumption have had limited effect; per-capita services consumption in China was 46.1% in 2025, well below the 70% seen in the U.S.
However, this new focus carries risks. The policy relies on a familiar supply-side playbook: the “build it and they will come” approach that fostered the rise of megacities and advanced industrial clusters. Analysts caution that applying this model to services could bring the same problems of wasteful investment and overcapacity that plague parts of China’s export-focused economy today.
“Chongli’s experience highlights an important dynamic: when frictions are reduced and capacity constraints are alleviated, demand can respond strongly,” said one head of Asia macro research at a major financial institution. “But China has no shortage of examples where overinvestment eventually resulted in underutilised or abandoned assets.”
Recent state media coverage has celebrated the booming “ice and snow” economy—encompassing ski resorts, dining, accommodation, and winter sports equipment manufacturing—projecting its value to grow significantly by 2030. Following this lead, local authorities across the country have unveiled plans to invest in various services. Northern provinces plan to expand winter sports facilities, while others are promoting everything from nightlife and concerts to yachting and medical tourism. Wealthier cities are focusing on education, health, and care for the elderly and children.
While no specific figures have been announced, this theme is expected to feature prominently in upcoming national policy documents. Analysts note that China currently faces supply shortages in all these service areas, but they also urge caution. “China’s boom in winter sports is a useful example highlighting how expanded infrastructure can unleash demand for services that hitherto lay dormant,” said a chief Asia economist at another large bank. “The risk, however, is that over-incentivising supply can also lead to excess capacity, with demand ultimately unable to meet the expectations.”
Back in Chongli, the local economy is thriving, with growth averaging 6.5% annually over the past five years, outpacing national figures. The town, which was once a struggling agrarian area, is now a bustling hub for tourists. Winter gear shops and restaurants are thriving. A 23-year-old student boasts of earning over 10,000 yuan monthly as a ski instructor—surpassing entry-level salaries in many other industries. A local taxi driver notes he now earns about a third more than he did as a truck driver in Beijing. As one local put it, “People say China’s economy is not good now, but I haven’t felt that.”
